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ABSTRACT 
There was no “middle layer” of government between the central state and 
the municipal level in the new member states of the European Union when these 
countries joined the EU recently. For various motivations – the ability to optimize 
access to EU funds being one of the motivations – the creation of a middle layer 
of regional government or administration has been discussed. In opposite to the 
new EU members Austria has already had a political system with three layers not 
only of administration but with three layers of government for several decades.  
Section 1 discusses major features of the territorial organization of Austria’s 
economy and its system of political decision making. Section 2 finds that history, 
a strong political preference for federalism, and pragmatism are major 
explanations for the emergence and durability of the system. Section 3 analyses 
the economic cost of Austria’s complex territorial organisation, and section 4 
shows the scope for economic policy action at the state level using examples 
from the state of Salzburg. 
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1. The territorial organization of Austria’s      
economy  
 
The territorial organization of Austria’s economy and its system of political 
decision making is rather complex. It comprises four levels of legislation: Since 
its accession to the European Union legislation at the EU-level affects and 
limits the degree of freedom of national politics. Austria itself is a federal state 
with three layers of government, with elected government institutions, inde-
pendent decision making powers and budgetary autonomy – the federation, 
the states, and the municipalities.  
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Austria’s 8 million inhabitants live in 9 states, the average size of a state 
being less than 10.000 square kilometres of land, and the median number of 
population being less than 700.000. Federalism, Austrian style means an own 
parliament, an own government, an own set of laws with an own administra-
tion etc. for small numbers of inhabitants. The states have substantial legisla-
tive powers which include social welfare, health care in the hospital sector, 
some areas of primary and secondary education, nature conservation, building 
regulations, and regional infrastructure planning, including transport.  
 
Table 1: Key data of Austrian states  
 
 Area (km²) 
Population 
(census 2001) 
Number of 
districts 
Number of 
municipalities 
9 states, average 9.319 892.547 11 262 
9 states, median 9.500 673.000 10 171 
8 states (without        
Vienna), minimum 
2.601 277.569 4 96 
9 states, maximum 19.178 1.550.123 25 573 
Austria, total 83.871 8.032.926 99 2.359 
Source: Statistik Austria (2006)  
 
Austria’s territory is organized in more than 2.300 municipalities. Austrian 
states comprise up to 573 autonomous municipalities; the median still is 171. 
The constitution guarantees the autonomy of the municipalities in all local mat-
ters. Municipal authorities perform policing and inspection tasks and local 
planning, and they provide infrastructure – such as water services and build-
ings for primary and secondary schools – and social services.  
Groups of municipalities can voluntarily form co-operations and are often 
mandatory members of co-operations of municipalities which address specific 
issues (e.g. in providing infrastructure, social and school services). These co-
operations of municipalities add another layer of administration to the whole 
system. 
Finally there is the district level: 99 districts have administrative compe-
tencies, but no elected government officials and no legislation power.  
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2. Administrative regions vs. functional regions 
 
The complex territorial organization of Austria’s political and administrative 
system is rooted in history and tradition as well as in a strong political will. 
Most parts of the provincial structure (states) and of the district structure of 
administration have been inherited already from the Habsburg monarchy and 
reflect the administrative entities of the monarchy. Many Austrians have 
strong emotional ties to the state they live in or they were born in. Federalism 
is one of the cornerstones of the constitution since Austria became a republic 
in 1920 and thus it is an expression of political will; the federalist structure has 
never been seriously disputed since then.  
From an economic point of view the diversified legislative and administra-
tive structure has some major advantages. Decentralised decision powers are 
expected to allow policy makers to take local preferences and specific regional 
needs of the population better into account than in a unitary state. It also al-
lows to take political decisions and to perform related administrative tasks at 
those levels of government at which the provision of public goods is most 
cost-effective.  
From a European Union member’s perspective regional entities below the 
level of the central state are important for attracting European Union regional 
and structural funds. The nomenclature of unit’s territorial statistics (NUTS) 
distinguishes several layers of statistical description of regions: At the NUTS 1 
level Austria is structured in three regions (east, south, and west) which have 
purely statistical significance (see Statistik Austria 2006, ch.37). The NUTS 2 
level reflects the basic administrative structure of the country, and therefore it 
is structured in 9 regions which are equivalent to the states. The NUTS 3 level 
Austria is structured in 35 regions which are equivalent to districts or clusters 
of districts within a state. Regions which are eligible to EU funds in most 
cases are defined according to the NUTS 2 classification, but EU documents 
also relate to NUTS 3 and even smaller regional entities. So the statistical re-
gional units are based on the existing administrative structure (availability of 
data!) and they were defined according to several criteria, one of them being 
the eligibility for EU support. While until 2005 the state of Burgenland was a 
target 1-area (which allows for the highest levels of support), now no Austrian 
state is defined as a target area for EU regional funding any more. 
By and large the territorial organisation of Austria’s economy reflects ad-
ministrative regions. Administrative regions are the units in which regional 
economic policies are designed and executed and the members of regional 
governments and regional parliaments find their constituencies in such re-
gions. Regional economic policy thus will primarily reflect the administrative 
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regions’ interests; therefore they are proper starting points for most purposes 
of regional economic policy analysis. “Functional regions” have much more 
intense economic interactions inside the region than with any other area out-
side the region and are likely to be congruent with labour market regions. In 
fact, the definitions of functional regions in a recent international survey on 
this topic (OECD 2002) are based on labour market regions in most countries. 
Although this definition might sometimes to be too narrow for the analysis of 
some issues as there are other than labour market interactions (e.g. flows of 
goods and services, flows of knowledge) regularly taking place which cross 
the borders of individual labour market regions, this concept is a proper start-
ing point for regional economic analyses.  
A major problem with administrative regions is that they only rarely are 
congruent with functional regions, which entails the emergence of positive 
and negative spillovers. This means that actions of one region’s government 
have an impact (positive or negative) on other regions which in turn have no 
possibility to avoid the negative impact or which have no incentive to pay for 
the provision of the service from which the positive impact derives. As there is 
no way to change the structure of administrative regions in Austria there has 
emerged a complex system of intergovernmental cooperation and financial 
relations as a pragmatic solution. The longer a “grown system” is in place the 
more difficult it seems to be to change that system. Therefore it might be 
particularly worthwhile to consider the concept of functional regions and to 
make administrative regions congruent with them when the territorial organi-
zation of a country is diversified by adding another layer of administration or 
government.  
 
 
3. The economic cost of Austria’s complex territo-
rial organisation structure 
 
Each additional layer of government imposes additional cost on a nation’s 
economy as the complexity of the system will be increased. Therefore the 
three layers of government within Austria and the complex relations among 
the many administrative units create substantial cost of the political and ad-
ministrative system. The waste of resources within this system (“There is 
much scope to improve the efficiency of revenue allocation across govern-
ments”; OECD 2005, p.14) has been a major topic of the latest OECD Eco-
nomic Survey of the Austrian economy.  
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Several interrelated issues are responsible for this situation: First, the 
mere size of Austria’s states (and even more so of municipalities) often does 
not allow exploiting economies of scale in the provision of public goods and 
services. Approximately half of Austria’s 2.300 municipalities count less than 
1.500 inhabitants, and cost of administration per capita are significantly higher 
in small municipalities than in larger ones.  
Second, in the field of legislation there is the “factor 9” (or even 10 if the 
federal level is included). Legislative bodies derive its existence and its mean-
ing from the production of laws and regulations, and administrations derive 
their existence from enacting regulations in a specific way. As Austria com-
prises nine states it has nine different parliaments producing law and regula-
tions at the sub-national level and nine different state governments which 
enact these laws and regulations. This is not only costly in terms of the direct 
resource cost of government like paying salaries and maintaining the adminis-
trative infrastructure, it also is the source of cost which is imposed on the 
population and on firms indirectly. Law and regulations at the state level are 
not always well co-ordinated among states, and therefore it is no wonder that 
sometimes negative implications for the macro-economy arise. For example, 
the laws governing subsidies for residential construction vary across states 
and therefore – in addition to its highly questionable impact on income distri-
bution – they impair mobility of labour between states and thus negatively 
affect the flexibility of the labour market. 
Third, the existence of several layers of government implies a great vari-
ety of forms of shared decision making processes which in many cases end 
up in a fragmentation of decision making across different layers of government 
(OECD 2005). Decision making competences in closely related areas are often 
assigned across different levels of government, responsibilities might overlap, 
and most administrative tasks emanating from federal legislation are delegated 
to the states, and – to a lesser extent – to the municipalities. In some matters 
the constitution assigns legislative powers on the framework conditions to the 
federal level, and states can set regulations within this framework. The frag-
mentation of decision making regularly goes hand in hand with inefficient in-
centive systems and/or a lack of transparency. The situation is even worsened 
because part of government activities have been outsourced to “private” 
firms in which a public authority still is the single owner, and in those cases in 
which other public entities like social insurance are involved.   
An example of inefficiencies is the sharing of responsibility in primary and 
secondary education among layers of government: Municipalities or co-
operations of municipalities provide buildings and other infrastructure (if 
“poor” municipalities are not able to do that the state might help), the states 
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employ the teachers and legislate teachers’ working conditions, while the 
federal government has to pay for the teachers’ salaries and sets up the 
curricula. Therefore the states have no incentive to save cost of teachers, 
which made the federal government develop a variety of regulations which 
entail a continuous series of re-negotiations of regulations and allocations. In 
effect, the degree of freedom for state policy is rather small.   
Another very costly example for the fragmentation of decision making is 
the spending responsibilities in health care. The constitution assigns legislative 
powers on the framework conditions of hospital care to the federal level, and 
the states legislate within this framework. Executive powers and financial 
responsibilities again involve all layers of government plus the social insurance, 
and it is further complicated by the fact that health care services provided by 
hospitals and those provided outside hospitals by practicing physicians have 
been managed separately. The states contribute only less than half of govern-
ment expenditure for hospital services but they play a dominant role in deci-
sion making for hospital services.  
Fourth, the Austrian federal system has experienced a dynamics of its 
own which is best reflected by developments in the federal financial system. 
After having run a federal system for several decades Austria has been con-
fronted now with a multitude of general rules, special regulations, and various 
provisions which have been added to the initial system of allocating public tax 
income to federal, state, and municipal governments. Earmarking of revenues, 
extra-budgetary funds, and co-financing arrangements between governments 
have increasingly become important and have increased the complexity of the 
system of federal fiscal relations. A consultation mechanism which aims to 
reduce cost spillovers of legislation originating from the federal or the state 
level on other levels of government was introduced in 1998 and has brought 
some relief. The legislating level of government has to reimburse other levels 
of governments for such cost spillovers; any municipal, state or the federal 
government can invoke the mechanism.  
 
 
4. The scope for economic policy action at the 
state level  
 
Finally, the possibilities of state governments to pursue an own distinct 
economic policy ought to be addressed from an empirical perspective. For this 
purpose the results of an analysis of five regional economic policy instruments 
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implemented by the state government of Salzburg (Scherrer, 2003) are reported 
briefly.  
A key element which determines the scope for regional policy and its 
success is its appropriate relation to policy at the federal level. Some issues 
obviously cannot be treated adequately at the regional level as the relevant 
agents are located outside the region or solving the issues would render impli-
cations which are considered delicate at the macroeconomic or federal level. 
This was one of the major reasons why an effort to enhance work-time flexibil-
ity failed in Salzburg.  
There can be a strong trade-off between customizing economic policy to 
local needs and cost efficient provision of public goods. An innovation stimula-
tion program is a good example: On the one hand it tried to provide custom-
tailored support for firms in the region, on the other hand the state govern-
ment does not have the expertise to evaluate innovation projects (and it would 
be extremely costly to develop that expertise). The state delegated the deci-
sion on funding to the federal level which improved efficiency but at the same 
time it raised difficulties to meet local needs. 
Federal policy interventions sometimes provide new opportunities for re-
gional policy initiatives. Response at the state level to federal legislation has to 
be timed properly (e.g. the effort to enhance work time flexibility came too 
late). States also have to weigh the benefit increased scope for regional policy 
intervention against the economic burden which might be shifted to them by 
the federal authorities. For example the federal government has legislated the 
founding of polytechnic universities (“Fachhochschulen”) in the 1990s and 
“allowed” the states to support them and thus to share the financial burden of 
provide tertiary education which by constitution is within the competencies of 
the central state.  
Another major result of the evaluation of policy instruments is that merely 
giving money – public money – is not sufficient for a successful policy inter-
vention: Complimentary advisory and consultancy services have been most 
important for the success of two of the economic policy instruments which 
have been analyzed, the village renewal program and the regional place mar-
keting organization.  
The evaluations further show that the impact of individual instruments is 
weak unless they are not part of a comprehensive economic policy strategy. 
Economic policy options within such a strategy at the state level basically 
seem to be twofold: First, there is a potential for “defensive” economic poli-
cies which largely aim at reducing the negative impact of change on those 
parts of the public which are hit most severely. These policies include social 
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policy and policies to attain regional equity; in many cases they are of a cura-
tive nature. Second, there is a potential for “pro-active” economic policies at 
the provincial level. These policies aim at improving the framework for eco-
nomic growth and development in the region and include innovation policy, 
build-up of infrastructure, land use regulation, education and labor market pol-
icy, and location marketing.  
In summary, a differentiated answer to the fundamental question about 
the potential scope of regional policy intervention has to be given, but some 
success stories suggest that such a potential exists. 
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POVZETEK 
Gospodarski vidiki »srednje ravni« administracije in   
upravljanja: nekaj izku{enj iz Avstrije 
 
Avstrija je država z 8 milijoni prebivalcev, zvezna parlamentarna republi-
ka od leta 1920, ki ima v svoji sestavi  9 dežel (Länder) in 99 upravnih okra-
jev (Politische Bezirke). Zakonodajna in izvr{ilna mo~ sta porazdeljeni med 
federalno državo in dežele, nižja raven od dežel pa so ob~ine (Gemeinde), 
ki ji je 2359. Ob~ine so teritorialne in hkrati upravne enote s pravico lokal-
ne samouprave, mesto Dunaj ima status dežele, okraja in ob~ine.  
Avstrijske dežele imajo precej{nje zakonodajne pristojnosti na pod-
ro~ju socialnega in zdravstvenega varstva, osnovnega in srednje{olskega 
izobraževanja, varstva okolja, gradbenih predpisov ter na~rtovanja regio-
nalne infrastrukture, vklju~no s prometom. Ustava zagotavlja avtonom-
nost ob~in glede vseh lokalnih zadev. Ob~inske oblasti so pristojne za 
policijsko dejavnost, in{pekcijske naloge in lokalno na~rtovanje ter infras-
trukturo, kot so vodovod in stavbe za osnovne in srednje {ole, in socialno 
skrbstvo. Upravni okraji imajo samo administrativne pristojnosti.  
Decentralizirana pristojnost odlo~anja naj bi oblikovalcem politike 
omogo~ala, da bodo bolje upo{tevali lokalne želje in posebne regionalne 
potrebe, kot je to mogo~e v unitarni državi. Sprejemanje politi~nih 
odlo~itev in izvajanje s tem povezanih administrativnih nalog naj bi se 
izvajalo na tistih ravneh upravljanja, kjer je zagotavljanje javnih dobrin 
stro{kovno najbolj u~inkovito.  
Po nomenklaturi statisti~nih teritorialnih enot (NUTS), ki so pomembne 
za pridobitev regionalnih in strukturnih skladov EU, se Avstrija nahaja na 
ravneh NUTS 1 (3), NUTS 2 (9) in NUTS 3 (35). Regije, upravi~ene do 
sredstev EU, so v ve~ini primerov opredeljene v skladu s klasifikacijo 
NUTS 2.  
Teritorialna organizacija avstrijskega gospodarstva odraža administra-
tivne regije, enote, v katerih se na~rtujejo in izvajajo regionalne gospodar-
ske politike. Te so primerno izhodi{~e za ve~ino namenov analize 
regionalne gospodarske politike. V "funkcionalnih regijah" potekajo precej 
bolj intenzivne gospodarske povezave znotraj regije kot z obmo~ji zunaj 
regije, za te regije pa je verjetno, da so skladne z regijami trga delovne 
sile. Glavna težava z administrativnimi regijami je v tem, da se redko ujemajo 
s funkcionalnimi regijami, kar ima za posledico pozitivne in negativne 
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u~inke. Veljalo bi razmisliti o konceptu funkcionalnih regij in te uskladiti z 
administrativnimi regijami. 
Vsaka dodatna raven upravljanja pomeni dodatne stro{ke v gospo-
darstvu države, saj se pove~a kompleksnost sistema. Tudi velikost avstrij-
skih dežel ({e bolj pa ob~in - približno polovica jih ima manj kot 1500 
prebivalcev) pogosto ne omogo~a izkori{~anja ekonomije obsega pri 
zagotavljanju javnih dobrin in storitev, stro{ki administracije na prebivalca 
pa so v majhnih ob~inah precej vi{ji kot v velikih.  Ker ima Avstrija devet 
dežel, ima devet razli~nih parlamentov, ki pripravljajo zakone in predpise 
na deželni ravni, ter devet razli~nih deželnih vlad, ki te zakone in predpise 
uresni~ujejo. To ni drago samo v smislu neposrednih stro{kov virov upra-
ve, kot so izpla~ila pla~ in vzdrževanje administrativne infrastrukture, tem-
ve~ je tudi vir stro{kov, ki se posredno prenesejo na prebivalce in 
podjetja. Razen tega zakoni in predpisi na državni in deželni ravni niso 
vedno dobro usklajeni, zato ni ~udno, da v~asih pride do negativnih 
makroekonomskih u~inkov. Obstoj ve~ ravni upravljanja pa pomeni tudi 
ve~jo razli~nost oblik procesov odlo~anja, kar ima v mnogih primerih za 
posledico razdrobljenost odlo~anja.   
Rezultati analize petih regionalnih instrumentov gospodarske politike, 
ki jih je uporabila deželna uprava Salzburga, kažejo, da je klju~ni element, 
ki dolo~a obseg pristojnosti regionalne politike in njeno uspe{nost, ustre-
zen odnos do politike na zvezni ravni. Ukrepi zvezne politike pomenijo 
v~asih tudi nove priložnosti za spremembe regionalne politike, vendar 
mora biti odziv deželne ravni na zvezno zakonodajo pravo~asen, dežele pa 
morajo tudi pretehtati, kak{na bi bila korist ve~jega obsega pristojnosti 
regionalne politike glede na gospodarsko breme, ki bi ga nanje lahko pre-
nesle zvezne oblasti.  Vpliv posameznih instrumentov je {ibak, ~e niso del 
iz~rpne strategije regionalne gospodarske politike. Analiza instrumentov 
politike pa je tudi pokazala, da za uspe{no spremembo regionalnih pris-
tojnosti ni zado{~ala zgolj zagotovitev javnih sredstev, ampak so bile  
odlo~ilne dodatne, strokovne svetovalne storitve.   
